I haven’t had need to do it.

I can ask people I work with who do know, or I can find the same thing ChatGPT provides in either la huage or project documentation, usually presented in a better format.

Ah, fair enough. I was just giving people interested in that method a resource to learn more about it.

The problem is that your method doesn’t consistently generate memorable passwords with anywhere near 77 bits of entropy.

First, the example you gave ended up being 11 characters long. For a completely random password using alphanumeric characters + punctuation, that’s 66.5 bits of entropy. Your lower bound was 8 characters, which is even worse (48 bits of entropy). And when you consider that the process will result in some letters being much more probable, particularly in certain positions, that results in a more vulnerable process. I’m not sure how much that reduces the entropy, but it would have an impact. And that’s without exploiting the fact that you’re using quoted as part of your process.

The quote selection part is the real problem. If someone knows your quote and your process, game over, as the number of remaining possibilities at that point is quite low - maybe a thousand? That’s worse than just adding a word with the dice method. So quote selection is key.

But how many quotes is a user likely to select from? My guess is that most users would be picking from a set of fewer than 7,776 quotes, but your set and my set would be different. Even so, I doubt that the set an attacker would need to discern from is higher than 470 billion quotes (the equivalent of three dice method words), and it’s certainly not 2.8 quintillion quotes (the equivalent of 5 dice method words).

If your method were used for a one-off, you could use a poorly known quote and maybe have it not be in that 470 billion quote set, but that won’t remain true at scale. It certainly wouldn’t be feasible to have a set of 2.8 quintillion quotes, which means that even a 20 character password has less than 77.5 bits of entropy.

Realistically, since the user is choosing a memorable quote, we could probably find a lot of them in a very short list - on the order of thousands at best. Even with 1 million quotes to choose from, that’s at best 30 bits of entropy. And again, user choice is a problem, as user choice doesn’t result in fully random selections.

If you’re randomly selecting from a 60 million quote database, then that’s still only 36 bits of entropy. When the database has 470 billion quotes, that’ll get you to 49 bits of entropy - but good luck ensuring that all 470 billion quotes are memorable.

There are also things you can do, at an individual level, to make dice method passwords stronger or more suitable to a purpose. You can modify the word lists, for one. You can use the other lists. When it comes to password length restrictions, you can use the EFF short list #2 and truncate words after the third character without losing entropy - meaning your 8 word password only needs to be 32 characters long, or 24 characters, if you omit word separators. You can randomly insert a symbol and a number and/or substitute them, sacrificing memorizability for a bit more entropy (mainly useful when there are short password length limits).

The dice method also has baked-in flexibility when it comes to the necessary level of entropy. If you need more than 82 bits of entropy, just add more words. If you’re okay with having less entropy, you can generate shorter passwords - 62 bits of entropy is achieved with a 6 short-word password (which can be reduced to 18 characters) and a 4 short-word password - minimum 12 characters - still has 41 bits of entropy.

With your method, you could choose longer quotes for applications you want to be more secure or shorter quotes for ones where that’s less important, but that reduces entropy overall by reducing the set of quotes you can choose from. What you’d want to do is to have a larger set of quotes for your more critical passwords. But as we already showed, unless you have an impossibly huge quote database, you can’t generate high entropy passwords with this method anyway. You could select multiple unrelated quotes, sure - two quotes selected from a list of 10 billion gives you 76.4 bits of entropy - but that’s the starting point for the much easier to memorize, much easier to generate, dice method password. You’ve also ended up with a password that’s just as long - up to 40 characters - and much harder to type.

This problem is even worse with the method that the EFF proposes, as it’ll output passphrases with an average of 42 characters, all of them alphabetic.

Yes, but as pass phrases become more common, sites restricting password length become less common. My point wasn’t that this was a problem but that many site operators felt that it was fine to cap their users’ passwords’ max entropy at lower than 77.5 bits, and few applications require more than that much entropy. (Those applications, for what it’s worth, generally use randomly generated keys rather than relying on user-generated ones.)

And, as I outlined above, you can use the truncated short words #2 list method to generate short but memorable passwords when limited in this way. My general recommendation in this situation is to use a password manager for those passwords and to generate a high entropy, completely random password for them, rather than trying to memorize them. But if you’re opposed to password managers for some reason, the dice method is still a great option.